Abstract. Non-interference is a security property which states that improper information leakages due to direct and indirect flows have not occurred through executing programs. In this paper we investigate a game semantics based formulation of non-interference that allows to perform a security analysis of closed and open procedural programs. We show that such formulation is amenable to automated verification techniques. The practicality of this method is illustrated by several examples, which also emphasize its advantage compared to known operational methods for reasoning about open programs.
Introduction
We address the problem of ensuring secure information flow of programs, which contain two kinds of global variables labeled as: "high security" (secert) and "lowsecurity" (public). Our aim is to prove that a program will not leak sensitive information about its high-security inputs to an external observer (attacker) who can see its low-security outputs. Thus we need to ensure that low-security outputs in all computations of the program do not depend on sensitive highsecurity inputs. This is also known as non-interference property [15] , because it states that secret data may not interfere with public data. We can show that the non-interference property holds for a program if no difference in lowsecurity outputs can be observed between any two computations (executions) of the program that differ only on their high-security inputs.
In this paper we propose a game semantics based approach to verify the non-interference property of closed and open programs. Game semantics [1] is a kind of denotational semantics which provides syntax-independent fully abstract (sound and complete) models for a variety of programming languages. This means that the obtained models are sound and complete with respect to observational equivalence of programs, and thus they represent the most accurate models we can find for a programming language. Compared to operational semantics several features of game (denotational) semantics make it very promising for automatic verification of security properties. First, it provides models for any open program fragments, i.e. programs with undefined identifiers such as calls to library functions. This allows us to reason about open programs, which is very difficult to do by using the known operational semantics based techniques. Second, the interpretation of programs is compositional, i.e. it is defined by induction on the program structure, which means that the game semantics model of a larger program is obtained from the models of its constituting subprograms, using a notion of composition. This is essential for achieving modular analysis, which is necessity for scalability when the method is applied to larger programs. Third, game semantics takes into account only extensional properties (what the program computes) of programs. Thus, programs are modeled by how they observationally interact with their environment, and the details of localstate manipulation are hidden, which results in small models with a maximum level of abstraction. This feature of game semantics is very important for efficient establishing of non-interference, since the non-interference also abstracts away from implementation details of a program and focusses on its visible inputoutput behaviour. Finally, game semantics models have been given certain kinds of concrete automata and process-theoretic representations, and in this way they provide direct support for automatic verification (by model checking) and program analysis of several interesting programming language fragments [9, 6] . Here we present another application of algorithmic game semantics for automatically verifying security properties of programs.
In this work we provide characterizations of non-interference based on the idea of self-composition [2] , and on the observation that game semantics is consistent and computationally adequate w.r.t. the operational semantics. In this way the problem of verifying non-interference is reduced to the verification of safety properties of programs. This will enable the use of existing game semantics based verification tools for checking non-interference. If the property does not hold, the tool reports a counter-example trace witnessing insecure computations of the given program.
Related work
The most common ways in which secret information can be leaked to an external observer are direct and indirect leakages, which are described by the noninterference property. There are also other ways to leak secret information within programs using mechanisms, known as covert channels [15] , whose primary task is not information transfer. Timing and termination leaks are examples of such covert channels. Here a program can leak sensitive information through its timing (resp., termination) behaviour, where an external attacker can observe the total running time (resp., termination) of programs.
The first attempts to verify security properties were by Denning in [4] . His work on program certification represents an efficient form of static program analysis that can be used to ensure secure information flows. However, this method offers only intuitive arguments for its correctness, and no formal proof is given.
Recently, a new formal approach has been developed to ensure security properties of programs by using security-type systems [11] . In this approach, for every program component are defined security types, which contain information about their types and security levels. Programs that are well-typed under these type systems satisfy certain security properties. Type systems for enforcing noninterference of programs have been proposed by Volpano and Smith in [16] , and subsequently they have been extended to detect also covert timing channels in [17] . The main drawback of this approach is its imprecision, since many secure programs are not typable and so are rejected. For example, in the case of non-interference the secure program: l := h; l := 0, where l and h are low-and high-security variables respectively, is not typable because there is an insecure direct flow in its subprogram l := h. One way to address this problem is to use static (information-flow and control-flow) analysis [3] . However, this approach is still imprecise due to the over-approximation and rejects many secure programs.
Semantics based models, that formalize security in terms of program behavior, appear to be essential for allowing more precise security analysis of programs. Security properties can be naturally expressed in terms of end-to-end program behaviour and, thus, become suitable for reasoning by semantic models of programs. For example, in [12, 14] programming-language semantics has been used to rigorously specify and verify the non-interference property.
Game semantics was also previously used for information-flow analysis [13] , but based on approximate representations of game semantics models. This was considered only as a possible application of the broader approach to develop program analysis by abstract interpretation in the setting of game semantics. However, this approach did not result in any practical implementations.
The Language
Idealized Algol (IA) [1] Well-typed terms are given by typing judgements of the form Γ M : T , where Γ = x 1 : T 1 , . . . , x k : T k is a type context consisting of a finite number of typed free identifiers. Typing rules are standard [1] , but the general application rule is broken up into the linear application and the contraction rule 1 .
We use these two rules to have control over multiple occurrences of free identifiers in terms during typing. The language also contains a set of constants and constructs: i :
Each construct represents a different programming feature, which can also be given in the more traditional form. For example, sequential composition ;
We say that a term M is closed if M : T is derivable. Any input/output operation in a term is done through global variables (i.e. free identifiers of type varD). So an input is read by dereferencing a global variable, while an output is written by an assignment to a global variable.
A type context is called var-context if all identifiers in it have type varD. Given a var-context Γ , we define a Γ -state s as a (partial) function assigning data values to the variables in Γ . We write St(Γ ) for the set of all such states. Let s be a Γ -state and s be a Γ -state such that all variables in Γ and Γ are distinct. Then, s ⊗ s is a {Γ, Γ }-state, such that s ⊗ s (x ) is equal either to s(x ) if x ∈ Γ , or to s (x ) if x ∈ Γ . The canonical forms of the language are defined by The operational semantics is defined by a big-step reduction relation: Γ M , s =⇒ V , s , where Γ is a var-context, and s, s represent Γ -states before and after evaluating the (well-typed) term Γ M : T to a canonical form V . Reduction rules are standard (see [1] for details). Since the language is deterministic, every term can be reduced to at most one canonical form.
Given a term Γ M : com, where Γ is a var-context, we say that M terminates in state s, written M , s ⇓, if Γ M , s =⇒ skip, s for some state s . If M is a closed term then we abbreviate the relation M , ∅ ⇓ with M ⇓. We define a program context C [−] ∈ Ctxt(Γ, T ) to be a term with (several occurrences of) a hole in it, such that if
If two terms approximate each other they are considered observationally-equivalent, denoted by Γ M ∼ = N .
Let Γ, ∆ M : T be a term where Γ is a var -context and ∆ is an arbitrary context. Such terms are called split terms, and we denote them as Γ | ∆ M : T . If ∆ is empty, then these terms are called semi-closed. The semi-closed terms have only some global variables, and the operational semantics is defined only for them. In the following we fix a context Γ 1 = l : varD, h : varD , where l represents a low-security (public) variable and h represents a high-security (secret) variable. We say that h is non-interfering with l in Γ 1 | − M : com if the same values for l and different values for h in a state prior to evaluation of the term M always result in a state after the evaluation of M where values for l are the same.
Definition 1. A variable h is non-interfering with l in
As it was argued in [2] , the formula (1), where two evaluations (computations) of the same term are considered, can be replaced by an equivalent formula, where we consider only one evaluation of the sequential composition of the given term with another its copy, such that the global variables are suitably renamed in the latter. So sequential composition enables us to place these two evaluations one after the other. Let Γ
It is easy to show that (1) and (2) Finally, we say that a term is secure if all global high-security variables are non-interfering with any of its global low-security variables.
Game Semantics
The game semantics model for IA 2 can be represented by regular languages [9] , which we sketch below. In game semantics, a kind of game is played by two participants: the Player, who represents the term being modeled, and the Opponent, who represents the context (environment) in which the term is used. The two alternate to make moves, which can be either a question (a demand for information) or an answer (a supply of information). Types are interpreted as arenas in which games are played, computations as plays of a game, and terms as strategies (sets of plays) for a game. In the regular-language representation, arenas (types) are expressed as alphabets of moves, plays (computations) as words, and strategies (terms) as regular-languages over alphabets of moves.
Each type T is interpreted by an alphabet of moves A [[T ]] , which can be partitioned into two subsets of questions Q [[T ]] and answers A [[T ]]
.
For function types, we have
from which type of the disjoint union each move originates. Each move in an alphabet represents an observable action that a term of the corresponding type can perform. So for expressions, we have a question move q to request the value of the expression, and possible responses are taken from the data type D. For commands, there is a question move run to initiate a command, and an answer move done to signal successful termination of a command. For variables, we have moves for writing to the variable: write(a), which is acknowledged by the move ok, and for reading from the variable: a question move read, and answers are from D.
Terms in β-normal form are interpreted by regular languages specified by extended regular expressions R. They are defined inductively over finite alphabets A using the following operations: the empty language ∅, the empty word ε, the elements of the alphabet a ∈ A, concatenation R · S , Kleene star R * , union R + S , intersection R ∩ S , restriction R | A (A ⊆ A) which removes from words of R all letters from A , substitution R[S /w ] which replaces all occurrences of the subword w in words of R by words of S , composition R o 9 S which is defined below, and shuffle R S which generates the set of all possible interleavings w 1 w 2 for any words w 1 of R and w 2 of S . Composition of regular expressions R defined over alphabet A 1 + B 2 and S over B 2 + C 3 is given as follows:
where R is a set of words of the form
and s contains only letters from A 1 . So the composition is defined over A 1 + C 3 , and all letters of B 2 are removed. It is a standard result that any extended regular expression obtained from the operations above denotes a regular language [9, pp. 11-12] , which can be recognized by a finite automaton.
A
term Γ M : T is interpreted by a regular expression [[Γ M : T ]] defined over the alphabet
where all moves corresponding to types of free identifiers are tagged with the names of those free identifiers. Every word in [[Γ M : T ]] corresponds to a complete play in the strategy for Γ M : T , and it represents the observable effects of a completed computation of the term.
Free identifiers are interpreted by the so-called copy-cat (identity) strategies, which contain all possible computations that terms of that type can have. In this way they provide the most general context in which an open term can be used. The general definition is: x . Then Opponent can provide an arbitrary value n from D for x , which will be copied by Player as answer to the first question q.
For the linear application, we have
, such that the moves associated with x 1 and x 2 are de-tagged so that they represent actions associated with x .
To represent local variables, we first need to define a (storage) 'cell' strategy cell v which imposes the good variable behaviour on the local variable. So cell v responds to each write(n) with ok, and plays the most recently written value in response to read, or if no value has been written yet then answers the read with the initial value v . Then we have:
Note that all actions associated with x are hidden away in the final model for new, since x is a local variable and so not visible outside of the term. Language constants and constructs are interpreted as follows:
We can see that any constant v is modeled by a word where the initial question q is answered by the value of that constant, whereas the "do-nothing" command skip is modeled by a word where Player immediately responds to the initial question run with done. The regular expression for any arithmetic-logic operation op asks for values of the arguments with moves q 1 and q 2 , and after obtaining them by m and n responds to the initial question q by the value (m op n). Example 1. Consider the term:
The model of this term is: run · q n · (0 n · run c · done c + 1 n ) · done. In the model are represented observable interactions of the term with its environment, so we can see only the moves associated with the non-local identifiers n and c as well as with the top-level type com. When the term (Player) asks for the value of n with the move q n , the environment (Opponent) provides an answer which can be 0 or 1, because the data type of n is int 2 = {0, 1} . If the value 0 is provided for n, then since x has also initial value 0 the command c is executed by moves run c and done c . Otherwise, if 1 is provided for n, the term terminates without running c. Note that all moves associated with the local variable x are not visible in the final model.
Formal Properties
We first show how this model is related with the operational semantics. In order to do this, the state needs to be represented explicitly in the model. A Γ -state s, where Γ = x 1 : varD 1 , . . . , x k : varD k , is interpreted by the following strategy:
, and words in [[s] ] are such that projections onto x i -component are the same as those of suitable initialized cell s(xi ) strategies. The interpretation of Γ M : com at state s is:
which is defined over the alphabet A [[com] ] . This interpretation can be studied more closely by considering the words in which moves associated with Γ are not hidden. Such words are called interaction sequences. For any interaction sequence
, where t is an even-length word over A [[Γ ] ] , we say that it leaves the state s if the last write moves in each x i -component are such that x i is set to the value s (x i ). For example, let s = (x → 1, y → 2), then the interaction sequence, run · write (5) y · ok y · read x · 1 x · done, leaves the state s = (x → 1, y → 5). The following results are proved in [1] for the full IA, but they also hold for the fragment we use here. 
Suppose that there is a special free identifier abort of type com abort in Γ . We say that a term Γ M is safe iff Γ M [skip/abort] ∼ M [diverge/abort]; otherwise we say that a term is unsafe. Since the game-semantics model is fully abstract, the following can be shown (see also [5] 
Checking Non-interference
We first describe how the game semantics model can be used to check the noninterference property of a semi-closed term.
Theorem 4. Let Γ 1 | − M : com be a semi-closed term. We have that
contains no unsafe plays Iff h is non-interfering with l in Γ 1 | − M : com as defined by (2).
Proof. Let us assume that the term in (3) is safe. Let ∆ = k : expD, k : expD , then we have:
where
] is safe, so any of its interaction sequences leaves the state s 1 ⊗ s 2 , such that s 1 (l ) = s 2 (l ). Otherwise, we would have unsafe plays. The last if statement does not change the state, because it does not contain write moves. So by Theorem 2 and Lemma 1 it follows that the fact (2) holds.
For the opposite direction, we assume that the fact (2) holds. Let consider 
is evaluated in the state s 1 ⊗ s 2 , and so its condition always evaluates to false, which implies that this model has no unsafe plays. Thus, the term in (3) is safe.
This unsafe play corresponds to one computation where l is set to 0, h is set to 1, and the argument of f is evaluated once; and another computation where initial values of l and h are both 0, and f also calls its argument once. The final value of l will be 1 in the first case and 0 in the second.
Consider the term M 3 which implements the linear-search algorithm: The meta variable k > 0 represents the array size. The term first copies the input value of h into a local variable y. The linear-search algorithm is then used to find whether the value stored in y is in the array x . If the the value is not found, l is updated to 1. In Fig. 2 is shown the model for this term with k = 2. If the value read from the environment for h is not present in any element of the array x , then the value 1 is written into l . Otherwise, the term terminates without writing into l . We can analyse this term with different values of k and different finite sets of integers used to model global variables l , h, and the array x , by generating the model in (7) for m = 0. We obtain that this term is insecure, with a counter-example corresponding to two computations, such that initial values of h are different, the initial value of l is 0, and the search succeeds in the one and fails in the other computation, thus they are leaving two different final values for l .
Conclusion
We presented a game semantics based approach for verifying security properties of closed and open sequential programs. The applicability of this approach was illustrated with several examples.
This work also has the potential to be applied to problems such as security of terms with infinite data types and verifying various types of security properties.
